Public Policy and Workers’ Rights: Wrongful Discharge Discipline Actions and Reasonable Good Faith Beliefs by McGinley, Ann C. & Porter, Nicole Buonocore
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship
2017
Public Policy and Workers’ Rights: Wrongful
Discharge Discipline Actions and Reasonable
Good Faith Beliefs
Ann C. McGinley
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law
Nicole Buonocore Porter
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Article is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at
the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
McGinley, Ann C. and Porter, Nicole Buonocore, "Public Policy and Workers’ Rights: Wrongful Discharge Discipline Actions and
Reasonable Good Faith Beliefs" (2017). Scholarly Works. 1143.
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/1143
PUBLIC POLICY AND WORKERS' RIGHTS: WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE DISCIPLINE ACTIONS AND REASONAB1-E
GOOD-FAITH BELIEFS
BY
ANN C. MCGINLEY & NICOLE BUONOCORE PORTER
I. INTRODUCTION ............................... ...... 512
II. CHAPTER 5. THE TORT OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN
VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY.................... ..... 515
A. Section 5.01. Wrongful Discharge in Violation of
Public Policy.............. ..................... 515
B. Section 5.02. Wrongful Discharge in Violation of
Public Policy: Protected Activities ........... ....... 517
C. Section 5.03. Wrongful Discharge in Violation of
Public Policy: Sources of Public Policy ............. 518
III. THE RESTATEMENT SHOULD PROTECT AGAINST
WRONGFUL DISCIPLINE AS WELL AS WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE .............................................. 519
A. Background of Wrongful Discipline Provision..................519
B. Current State Court Practice: Wrongful Discipline or
Wrongful Discharge? ..................... ...... 520
C. Constructive Discharge as Substitute for Wrongful
Discipline? ....................................... 522
1. Proving Intolerable Working Conditions .... ..... 523
2. Summary Judgment in Constructive Discharge
Cases .................................... 525
D. A Potential Model: Wrongful Discipline as an Adverse
Employment Action .................... ........ 526
IV. THE ERROR OF ADDING "REASONABLE" TO SECTION
5.02 ................................................ 528
A. The State of the Law ....................... ...... 528
B. The Error of Adding "Reasonable".........................533
1. "Reasonable" Belief Requirement Creates an
Unacceptably High Standard .................... 534
2. Encouraging Behaviors that Protect the Public...........537
511
512 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 21:511
3. Employers Are Protected by a "Good Faith"
Requirement and by Requiring that the Protected
Activity Be Performed in a "Reasonable Manner" .... 538
4. Similar Arguments Under Analogous Areas of
Law .............................. ....... 542
V. CONCLUSION............................... ............. 543
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to provide our thoughts on Chapter
5 of the ALI's Restatement of the Law: Employment Law
("Restatement of Employment Law"), concerning "The Tort of
Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy."' In 2009, a group
of esteemed professors provided an in-depth and detailed
commentary on the prior draft of Chapter 5 of the Restatement of
Employment Law (note that in the prior draft, current chapter 5 was
chapter 4).2 At that time, the Working Group was in a position to
guide and influence the final version of the Restatement of
Employment Law. Thus, the Working Group's paper provides
detailed (section-by-section) critiques of the language used by the
Restatement, as well as feedback on the comments, the illustrations,
and the cases cited in the comments and illustrations.'
At this time, however, we are commenting on an already-
published Restatement of Employment Law. Thus, we see our role in
this process as both more limited and yet fairly boundless. Our role is
more limited in the sense that a line-by-line critique at this stage
serves very little purpose. In fact, it would be nothing but criticism or
disagreement for the sake of criticizing or disagreeing with principles
espoused and the rules and holdings of the cases the Reporters relied
upon. But our role is also fairly boundless in the sense that, because
we are relieved of the responsibility of directly influencing what is
published as the Restatement of Employment Law, we can provide
* William S. Boyd Professor of Law, Boyd School of Law of the University of Nevada,
Las Vegas. Thanks to the Wiener-Rogers Library at Boyd School of Law, and especially David
McClure, for the fine research contributing to this project.
** Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. The authors would like to
thank Professor Ken Dau-Schmidt for inviting us to contribute to this project, and the other
participants at the conference for their helpful feedback.
1. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW §§ 5.01, 5.02,5.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
2. Joseph R. Grodin et al., Working Group on Chapter 4 of the Proposed Restatement of
Employment Law: The Tort of Wrongful Discipline in Violation of Public Policy, 13 EMP. RTs.
& EMP. POL'Y J. 159 (2009) [hereinafter "Working Group"].
3. See generally id.
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our ideas concerning where the law ought to be or go in this area.
Moreover, we are not in the position of having to convince a large
group of persons with disparate interests of the value of our
proposals, or even of defending our proposals as in keeping with the
history and purpose of ALI's Restatements. Instead, we take our
critique directly to the lawmakers: judges in a common law system, as
well as legislators who hope to enhance the rights of employees
without harming their employers' interests. In an era of division
between management and labor, changing employment relationships,
weakening of labor unions in the private and public sectors, and
severe income inequality, we hope to create an interest in courts and
legislatures in experimentation that would improve the conditions of
workers and management.
In particular, we hope that courts that consider adopting Chapter
5 of the Restatement of Employment Law will also consider our
critiques and suggestions in determining how state common law
should be interpreted in this area. Moreover, we hope to give
guidance to state and local legislatures that may be interested in
enacting more protective legislation for working persons in the
various states, legislation that will give employers notice of their
responsibilities and will encourage economic growth. Therefore, we
offer specific comments on how the law could potentially be more
effective in protecting employee rights while at the same time
respecting employer prerogatives. Thus, we contemplate that at least
some courts and/or legislatures would adopt our views of
improvements to Chapter 5. Adoption of our views would, we
believe, permit further experimentation among the states that will
lead to better results than adoption by all states of Chapter 5 as it is
now.
To be clear, the Working Group also saw its role as aspirational
in nature; specifically, it stated:
Although some value exists in merely stating the consensus
respecting these rules, the mission of the ALI extends beyond that,
to better adapt the law to social needs and secure the better
administration of justice .... We therefore wish to help foster a
Restatement that is not only rooted in precedent, but also seeks to
reframe the law while retaining enough flexibility and open texture
to allow the law to evolve in response to new realities.
Despite this broad goal, and even though the Working Group did in
fact provide big-picture advice on the Restatement, the Working
4. Id. at 160.
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Group's commentary was also very specific and very detailed.
Our goal is different. Instead of a detailed critique of Chapter 5's
provisions, we have chosen to focus on two significant issues that we
see as problematic and worthy of further discussion. The first involves
the elimination in the final draft of the Restatement of protection
against wrongful discipline, which left only the protection against
wrongful discharge that violates public policy. In the prior version of
this chapter, section 4.01 was titled "Employee Discipline in Violation
of Public Policy," and protected against a wide variety of employee
discipline, including discharge. The final version of Chapter 5,
however, protects employees against "wrongful discharge" only6 and
comment c to section 5.01 states that this "Restatement expresses no
view on whether public-policy claims based on adverse employer
actions falling short of discharge or constructive discharge (termed
here 'wrongful discipline') should be actionable."' We argue that
wrongful discipline claims should be actionable and that the
Restatement should have specifically included wrongful discipline
claims in violation of public policy.
The second significant failure that we would like to address
appears in section 5.02 (protected activities), which requires that an
employee "reasonably" believe a particular set of facts or
circumstances in order to establish a wrongful discharge claim.
Although we recognize that the provisions of section 5.02 accurately
restate the law (and in some cases even expand on existing state law),'
we believe that requiring a "reasonable" belief is too high of a
standard, especially when the reasonableness of that belief is judged
by a law-trained judge's perception rather than a lay person's
5. To be clear, we are not at all criticizing what was produced in the Working Group's
commentary. In fact, it is very likely that the Working Group's commentary influenced the
current version of the Restatement of Employment Law in a positive way.
6. In fact, it is titled "The Tort of Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy."
Restatement of Employment Law, Chapter 5, and the main section states that "[a]n employer
that discharges an employee because the employee engages in activity protected by a well-
established public policy ... is subject to liability in tort for wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy." RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 5.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (emphasis added).
7. Id. § 5.01 cmt. c.
8. For instance, in order to have a claim for refusing to commit an act that violates the
law, or for reporting conduct that the employee believes violates a law, some states require that
the act avoided or the conduct reported would actually violate the law rather than the more
lenient framework set up by the Restatement, see id. §§ 5.02(a), 5.02(e), where the employee
need only "reasonably and in good faith believe" that the conduct would violate the law. See,
e.g., Callantine v. Staff Builders, Inc., 271 F.3d 1124, 1130-31 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that
plaintiff loses on her public policy exception in Missouri because the act she refused to do was
not actually an illegal act); Bordell v. Gen. Elec. Co., 667 N.E.2d 922, 923 (N.Y. 1996) (stating
that the law only protects employees who report conduct that actually violates the law).
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perception of what is reasonable. Therefore, we argue that the
provisions of section 5.02 should omit the requirement of a
"reasonable" belief and require only a "good faith" belief that certain
conduct would violate the law or harm the public in order to allow the
employee's public policy claim to proceed.
This paper will proceed in four additional parts. Part II
summarizes generally the provisions of Chapter 5, the Working
Group's objections to the earlier version and recommendations for
changes, and explains (when appropriate) where the final version
deviated from the prior version. Part III argues that this chapter
should have kept the prior version's protection against wrongful
discipline instead of protecting only against wrongful discharge. Part
IV argues that requiring employees to have a "reasonable" belief (in
addition to a good faith belief) that conduct will violate the law or
harm the public's health or safety is an inappropriately high standard
and should be abandoned in favor of requiring only a good faith
belief. Part V briefly concludes.
II. CHAPTER 5. THE TORT OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN
VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
A. Section 5.01. Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy
Section 5.01 states:
An employer that discharges an employee because the employee
engages in activity protected by a well-established public policy as
described in § 5.02 is subject to liability in tort for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy, unless the statute or other
law forming the basis of the applicable public policy precludes tort
liability or otherwise makes judicial recognition of a tort claim
inappropriate.
As mentioned above, this section is significantly different from
the prior version (section 4.01) because it does not cover wrongful
discipline that falls short of a discharge. This issue will be discussed
below in Part III.o The other difference is that the prior version had
slightly different language regarding the exception to the public
policy claim, when a statute or other law precludes the wrongful
discharge claim. The prior version permitted a claim "unless the
statute or other law that forms the basis of the applicable public
policy precludes tort liability or provides an adequate alternative
9. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 5.01.
10. See infra Part III.
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remedy."" The Working Group criticized the language as being
"unnecessarily vague" as well as doing "little to clarify an area of the
law that is currently quite confused" and failing to "offer a coherent
method for analysis in an area in which courts have also failed to
provide coherent analysis."12
The Working Group proposed different language to clarify the
exclusions.13 The Working Group suggested deleting the "unless the
statute or other law" language and substituting the following for
"cases in which the source of public policy is statutory":
(i) if the relevant statute expressly indicates that it is intended to
bar other remedies, a court should not recognize a claim against the
employer for wrongful discipline in violation of public policy;
(ii) if the relevant statute expressly indicates that it is not intended
to bar other remedies, a claim against the employer for wrongful
discipline in violation of public policy should be recognized in
appropriate circumstances;
(iii) if the relevant statute does not clearly express an intent to bar
or not to bar other remedies, a court may decline to recognize a
claim for wrongful discipline in violation of public policy when the
statute provides a remedy that is sufficient to protect both the
public interest and the injured employee. In determining whether a
remedy is sufficient to protect the public interest and the injured
employee, a variety of factors should be considered, including but
not limited to:
* the comprehensiveness of the regulation of the
employment relationship;
* the strength of the public policy and whether it is
expressed in sources other than the statute providing a
remedy;
* the extent of the remedy provided by statute;
* the extent of employee control over the enforcement
process; and
* the procedural restrictions placed on pursuing the
statutory claim.14
The drafters did not follow the Working Group's suggestion to
include the above factors, but incorporated many of the ideas of the
proposed language into the comments to section 5.01." For instance,
comment d refers to "express statutory preclusion of a common-law
11. Working Group, supra note 2, at 161.
12. Id. at 162.
13. Id. at 163.
14. Id. at 163-64.
15. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 5.01 cmt. d, e, f.
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public-policy tort,"" which basically mirrors proposed subsection (i)
above in the Working Group's suggested addition. Comment e in the
final draft is termed "Implied Statutory preclusion or otherwise
inappropriate judicial recognition of a tort action,"' 7 and it addresses
many of the factors that the Working Group identified in proposed
subsection (iii) in the Working Group's suggested addition. For
instance, comment e instructs that courts should look at the adequacy
of the remedy provided by the statute as well as comprehensiveness
of the state statute." Although we assume the Working Group would
have preferred that the drafters incorporate their suggested revision,
it appears that some of the concerns of the Working Group have been
addressed in the comments to section 5.01.
B. Section 5.02. Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy:
Protected Activities
Section 5.02 makes an employer liable for violation of public
policy if it discharges an employee who acts reasonably and refuses to
commit an act the employee reasonably and in good faith believes is
illegal, performs a public duty the employee reasonably and in good
faith believes is imposed by law, files a charge in good faith, refuses to
waive a nonnegotiable or nonwaivable right at the employer's
insistence, reports conduct that the employee reasonably and in good
faith believes is illegal, or engages in other activity that furthers public
policy. 9
This section varies from the prior version in two significant ways.
It adds the provision: "refuses to waive a nonnegotiable or
nonwaivable right." 20 And more importantly for our purposes, the
requirement that an employee's belief be reasonable did not appear in
the prior version of 4.02. Unlike the prior draft, the final version of
section 5.02 requires an employee have not only a good faith belief
that his or her behavior is protected but also a reasonable belief that it
is. 21 We will discuss this change further in Part IV.'
16. Id. § 5.01 cmt. d.
17. Id. § 5.01 cmt. e.
18. Id.
19. Id. § 5.02.
20. Interestingly, the Working Group noted that subsection (d) had been present in an
earlier draft of Chapter 5 (what used to be Chapter 4), and the Working Group suggested
reinstating that provision. Working Group, supra note 2, at 187.
21. Id. at 183.
22. See infra Part IV.
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Most of the Working Group's commentary on section 5.02 (what
used to be section 4.02 in the prior draft) involved either minor
critiques regarding cases cited by the draft that did not support the
propositions for which they were cited or comments and illustrations
that were not consistent with the text. 23 The major critique, however,
was that section 4.02 did not cover activities related to off-duty
conduct and activities involving privacy.24 The drafters of the final
version specifically addressed this critique in comment a, stating:
"This Chapter does not address whether employers engage in tortious
behavior if they discharge employees for certain off-duty conduct
implicating protected privacy or autonomy interests. Employee
privacy and autonomy issues are treated in Chapter 7."2
C. Section 5.03. Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy:
Sources of Public Policy
Section 5.03 states:
Sources of public policy for the tort of wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy under § 5.01 include:
(a) Federal and state constitutions;
(b) Federal, state, and local statutes, ordinances, and decisional
law;
(c) Federal, state, and local administrative regulations,
decisions, orders; and
(d) Well-established principles in a professional or
occupational code of conduct protective of the public interest.26
This section remains unchanged from the prior draft. The
Working Group's primary critique of this section was the
Restatement's failure to include international sources of law.27
Specifically, the Working Group recommended the addition of a
subsection (e) that would read: "established principles of customary
international law or foreign treaties to which the United States is a
party."2 Obviously, the drafters of the Restatement did not adopt the
Working Group's recommendation. We agree with the Working
23. Working Group, supra note 2, at 184.
24. Id.
25. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 5.02 cmt, a (AM. LAW INST. 2015). For a discussion of
Chapter 7, see Matthew W. Finkin, Chapter 7: Privacy and Autonomy, 21 EMP. RTs. & EMP.
POL'Y J. 589 (2017).
26. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 5.03.
27. Working Group, supra note 2, at 195.
28. Id.
PUBLIC POLICY AND WORKERS' RIGHTS
Group that international sources of law should constitute valid public
policy that is protected by the Restatement's wrongful discipline
section.
III. THE RESTATEMENT SHOULD PROTECT AGAINST WRONGFUL
DISCIPLINE AS WELL AS WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
A. Background of Wrongful Discipline Provision
The earlier versions of the draft Restatement of Employment Law
included a cause of action for wrongful discipline in violation of
public policy.2 9 Section 4.01 of Tentative Draft No. 2 states:
(a) An employer that discharges or takes other material adverse
action against an employee because the employee has or will
engage in protected activity under § 4.02 is subject to liability in tort
for wrongful discipline in violation of public policy, unless the
statute or other law that forms the basis of the applicable public
policy precludes tort liability or otherwise makes inappropriate
judicial recognition of a tort claim.
(b) "Other material adverse action" in this Section means an action
short of discharge that is reasonably likely to deter a similarly
situated employee from engaging in protected activity, including an
action that significantly affects employee compensation or working
conditions.-o
The "wrongful discipline" cause of action in violation of public
policy in earlier drafts of the Restatement created a cause of action for
wrongful discipline, which included discharge and an employer's
discipline that falls short of discharging the employee. According to
the earlier draft, the employer's behavior must be "likely to deter a
similarly situated employee from engaging in protected activity" to
create a cause of action. By the time the Restatement was published in
its final version, however, there no longer remained a cause of action
for wrongful discipline. Instead, the final Restatement has a cause of
action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. In other
words, the Restatement limits a tortious discharge cause of action to
disciplinary action that results in discharge or constructive discharge,
even if the reasons for lesser but significant discipline would violate
public policy and the discipline would likely deter employees from
engaging in protective activity. The final version, section 5.01, states:
An employer that discharges an employee because the employee
29. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) EMP'T LAW §§ 4.01,4.02, 4.03 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2009).
30. See id.
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engages in activity protected by a well-established public policy as
described in § 5.02 is subject to liability in tort for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy, unless the statute or other
law forming the basis of the applicable public policy precludes tort
liability or otherwise makes judicial recognition of a tort claim
inappropriate."
This change from the earlier version of the Restatement
effectively permits employers to punish employees for the very same
reasons that it would be illegal to discharge them. The Restatement
''expresses no view on whether public-policy claims based on adverse
employer actions falling short of discharge or constructive
discharge ... should be actionable."3 2
As a result of the Restatement's failure to address wrongful
discipline, the only limitation on the employer's actions that fall short
of outright firing of the employee is referenced in comment c to
section 5.01, which states that section 5.01 also creates a cause of
action for constructive discharge. A constructive discharge section, if
very broadly construed, could potentially provide much of the
necessary protection for employees and for the public policy asserted.
But given that constructive discharge is a common law doctrine that
involves a rigid proof standard that is often difficult to meet, this
limitation is troubling.
B. Current State Court Practice: Wrongful Discipline or Wrongful
Discharge?
Most state courts recognize a tort action for wrongful discharge
in violation of public policy or a similar cause of action.3 3 A minority
of the states recognize a wrongful discipline cause of action in
violation of public policy.3 In refusing to recognize wrongful
discipline, courts make conclusory statements that their jurisdictions
do not have a cause of action for wrongful discipline or state that they
are concerned about "opening the floodgates" of litigation for minor
disciplinary matters.3 5
31. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW, § 5.01 cmt. c.
32. Id.
33. Id. § 5.01 cmt. a; see, e.g., Mintz v. Bell Atl. Sys. Leasing, Int'l. Inc., 905 P.2d 559, 562
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (citing to existence of wrongful discharge cause of action, but refusing to
recognize wrongful failure to promote case in violation of public policy); Jewett v. Gen,
Dynamics Corp., No. 530943, 1997 WL 255093, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 1, 1997) (noting
existence of wrongful discharge tort, but refusing to recognize wrongful demotion claim in
Connecticut).
34. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 5.01 cmt. c.
35. See e.g., Ryan v Patterson Dental Supply, Inc., No. CV-98-1177, 2000 WL 640859, at
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As a practical and policy matter, these arguments do not make
much sense. First, if the purpose of the wrongful discharge tort is to
protect the public policy that the employer has violated, there is less
protection for the public policy if the employer may legally retaliate
against the employee by disciplining rather than by discharging the
employee. A more robust cause of action that includes discipline
would offer significant deterrence against employer violations of
public policy without necessarily creating frivolous litigation against
the employer. This cause of action could use the standard listed in the
earlier versions of the Restatement that would require an employee to
prove a "materially adverse employment action," defined as "action
short of discharge that is reasonably likely to deter a similarly situated
employee from engaging in protected activity, including an action that
significantly affects employee compensation or working conditions."3 6
As the Supreme Court of Kansas, which has recognized a cause
of action for wrongful demotion in violation of public policy, states:
The employers' violation of public policy and the resulting coercive
effect on the employee is the same in both situations. The loss or
damage to the demoted employee differs in degree only. We do not
share the employers' concern that a torrent of litigation of
insubstantial employment matters would follow in the wake of our
recognition of a cause of action for retaliatory demotion and, even
if we did, it does not constitute a valid reason for denying
recognition of an otherwise justified cause of action.
We conclude that the recognition of a cause of action for retaliatory
demotion is a necessary and logical extension of the cause of action
for retaliatory discharge. To conclude otherwise would be to
repudiate this court's recognition of a cause of action for retaliatory
discharge. The obvious message would be for employers to demote
rather than discharge employees in retaliation for filing a workers
compensation claim or whistleblowing. Thus, employers could
negate this court's decisions recognizing wrongful or retaliatory
discharge by taking actions falling short of actual discharge.37
Other state courts have agreed with the Kansas Supreme Court
and have recognized causes of action for wrongful discipline in
violation of public policy because it would protect the public policy
*24 (D. Ore. May 12, 2000); White v. Washington, 929 P.2d 396, 407-08 (Wash. 1997) (en banc).
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) EMP'T LAW §§ 4.01, 4.02, 4.03 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2009).
37. Brigham v. Dillon Cos., Inc., 935 P.2d 1054, 1059-60 (Kan. 1997); accord Powers v.
Springfield City Schs., No. 98-CA-10, 1998 WL 336782, at *7 (Ct. App. Ohio June 26, 1998)
(agreeing with Brigham and concluding that to disallow a cause of action for wrongful denial or
promotion in violation of public policy would undermine state public policy).
2017] 521
522 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 21:511
asserted most fully.8
C. Constructive Discharge as Substitute for Wrongful Discipline?
One way to defend the choice not to create a cause of action for
wrongful discipline that reaches employer behavior that falls short of
discharge is to argue that the types of behaviors that would constitute
"materially adverse employment actions" would necessarily
constitute a constructive discharge. Because, the argument goes,
constructive discharge is prohibited under the Restatement, there
should be no problem eliminating wrongful discipline from
protection. Unfortunately, recognition of constructive discharge
under the wrongful discharge exception may not sufficiently protect
the public policy involved or the individual employee who suffers the
adverse employment action that falls short of discharge. Under both
federal and state laws, employees claiming that they were
constructively discharged must demonstrate that the employer or its
agents created working conditions that were so intolerable that the
employees were forced to quit." The standard of "intolerability" is an
objective one. A reasonable person in the same situation would have
to conclude that the conditions of employment were so intolerable
that he or she would quit." The California Supreme Court expresses
the rule that is generally applicable in the states:
In order to establish a constructive discharge, an employee must
plead and prove, by the usual preponderance of the evidence
standard, that the employer either intentionally created or
knowingly permitted working conditions that were so intolerable or
aggravated at the time of the employee's resignation that a
reasonable employer would realize that a reasonable person in the
employee's position would be compelled to resign.
For purposes of this standard, the requisite knowledge or intent
must exist on the part of either the employer or those persons who
effectively represent the employer, i.e., its officers, directors,
managing agents, or supervisory employees.
In a minority of jurisdictions, the courts also require a showing
that the employer had a subjective intent to force the employee to
resign.42 Additionally, some courts require that an employee
38. See e.g., Powers, No. 98-CA-10, 1998 WL 336782.
39. See e.g., Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022,1029 (Cal. 1994) (in banc).
40. Id. at 1027.
41. Id at 1029.
42. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Des Moines Bolt Supply, Inc., 626 F.3d 410, 418 (8th Cir. 2010);
Moore v. Kuka Welding Sys., 171 F.3d 1073, 1080 (6th Cir. 1999); Martin v. Cavalier Hotel
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demonstrate that she gave the employer a reasonable opportunity to
correct the conditions that she claims constituted a constructive
discharge.43 Illustration 1 following section 5.01 is silent on whether it
requires proof of a specific subjective intent of the employer to force
the employee out of the workplace or proof that an employee gave
the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the allegedly
intolerable conditions, but it appears not to require such proof." If
interpreted this way, the constructive discharge provision of section
5.01 would at least have some beneficial value, but given the difficulty
that courts impose on employees who must prove that the conditions
were intolerable, the failure to include a wrongful discipline cause of
action will seriously undermine the public policies supporting the
wrongful discharge cause of action.
1. Proving Intolerable Working Conditions
Proving intolerability is a steep climb in many state and federal
courts. Courts state that workers should expect normal frustrations
and concerns in the workplace. None of these will constitute an
intolerable situation.45 And, in cases alleging discrimination and/or
harassment based on protected characteristics, demonstration that the
employer discriminated against the employee or that it subjected her
to severe or pervasive harassing behavior because of her membership
in a protected class is not sufficient to prove a constructive
discharge."
In non-harassment cases alleging intolerable working conditions,
courts will generally take into account factors such as:
Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1354 (4th Cir. 1995). But see Nolan v. Cleland, 686 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1982)
(no specific employer intent needed); Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1175 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(same); Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); Slack v.
Kanawha Cty. Hous. & Redev. Auth., 423 S.E.2d 547, 558 (W. Va. 1992) (same).
43. See, e.g., Ames v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F.3d 763, 769 (8th Cir. 2014)
(concluding that plaintiff had not provided evidence that she offered her employer an
opportunity to ameliorate the conditions that she alleged were discriminatory).
44. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 5.01 illus. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
45. See Turner, 876 P.2d at 1026-27.
46. See e.g., Penn. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 146-47 (2004) (holding that a
hostile-environment constructive discharge claim entails something more than a hostile
environment claim and a plaintiff "must show working conditions so intolerable that a
reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign"); Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210,
230 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that a woman who was harassed through graffiti and verbal attacks,
attacked by a drunken colleague, and then ridiculed for the attack, refused a promotion, and
encouraged to move to another job did not suffer an intolerable situation that amounted to a
constructive discharge); Shepherd v. Hunterdon Dev. Ctr., 803 A.2d 611, 628 (N.J. 2002)
("Simply put, a constructive discharge claim requires more egregious conduct than that
sufficient for a hostile work environment claim.").
2017] 523
524 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 21:511
(1) demotion; (2) reduction in salary; (3) reduction in job
responsibilities; (4) reassignment to menial or degrading work; (5)
reassignment to work under a younger supervisor; (6) badgering,
harassment, or humiliation by the employer calculated to
encourage the employee's resignation; or (7) offers of early
retirement [or continued employment on terms less favorable than
the employee's former status]. 47
These are merely factors that courts should weigh in determining the
intolerability of the situation. But how intolerable a situation is will
depend very much on the particular environment of the workplace
and the type of work that the plaintiff does. This means that, although
many courts determine that a situation is not intolerable as a matter
of law, these cases should instead generally go to fact finders who can
assess the witnesses' stories and the workplace environment.
Nonetheless, even when some or many of these factors exist, many
courts conclude that a constructive discharge has not occurred as a
matter of law.8
Illustration 1 to section 5.01 of the Restatement of Employment
Law gives the following example of a successful constructive
discharge case:
E, an employee of X, is injured on the job. X's supervisor, S, urges
E not to pursue a workers' compensation claim. E nevertheless files
such a claim. S then demotes E for filing the claim. As a result, E is
given less significant duties, must work under persons he previously
supervised, and suffers a reduction in pay. Because of the
demotion, E resigns. E has a claim for constructive discharge in
violation of public policy because the promotion created an
intolerable situation in which a reasonable employee would feel
compelled to quit, and E did quit. 49
This example includes not only a demotion but also a loss in pay, less
important duties, and supervision by a person whom the plaintiff
previously had supervised. There is no evidence that the employer
specifically intended to force the plaintiff to resign or that the plaintiff
gave the employer a reasonable opportunity to ameliorate the
intolerable conditions. It appears, therefore, that specific employer
intent and granting a reasonable opportunity to the employer to
ameliorate the situation would not be required by the Restatement.
But this fact pattern also includes most of the facts listed as relevant
to many constructive discharge cases. There is no question that at a
47. Brown v. Bunge Corp., 207 F.3d 776, 782 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Barrow v. New
Orleans Steamship Ass'n, 10 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1994)).
48. See, e.g., Martin v. Sears Roebuck & Co, 899 P.2d 551, 553 (Nev. 1995).
49. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 5.01 ilus. 1.
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minimum this case should be sufficient to fulfill the intolerability
requirement of a constructive discharge, but there is considerable
variation as to whether a constructive discharge exists absent some of
the factors, especially demotion with a reduction in pay.
2. Summary Judgment in Constructive Discharge Cases
Moreover, many courts in response to an employer's motion for
summary judgment decide the question of whether there was a
constructive discharge as a matter of law, and grant the defendant's
motion. Whether an employee's reaction to a fraught situation
constitutes a constructive discharge, however, is a fact-laden
determination. Jurors are better qualified than a judge at the
summary judgment stage to decide whether a constructive discharge
has occurred because jurors will have the benefit of assessing the
credibility of the witnesses' testimony at trial.
A good example of inappropriate fact-finding in a constructive
discharge case by the federal district court that was subsequently
affirmed by the court of appeals is Ames v. Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co.i In Ames, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment to the
defendant" in a case where there were many factual allegations
concerning the employer's treatment of the plaintiff that, if believed,
could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that a constructive discharge
had occurred. The facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, were that the defendant or its agents had made
numerous negative comments about the plaintiff's pregnancies;
miscalculated the length of her pregnancy leave and required her to
return to work early - two months after giving birth - or risk "raising
red flags;" trained another employee to fill her position; refused to
allow her to use the lactation room and told her she would have to
wait three days to use the lactation room even though the plaintiff
was obviously in pain as a result of her milk-filled breasts; told the
plaintiff on the day she returned from her maternity leave that no one
did her work while she was out on leave and that she would have to
work overtime to catch up or she would be disciplined; never helped
her to get necessary access to the lactation room or a reasonable
substitute even though she was in obvious pain; and told her she
should "go home to be with [her] babies" while waiving a resignation
50. 760 F.3d 763, 769 (8th Cir. 2014).
51. Id. at 768.
2017]1 525
526 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 21:511
letter for her to fill out.52 Finally, five hours after she last breastfed
her baby and in extreme pain, the employee submitted her
*13
resignation.
While reasonable minds might differ as to whether the employer
intended to force the plaintiffs resignation and whether this behavior
created an intolerable situation for the plaintiff and even whether she
gave the employer a reasonable opportunity to ameliorate the
intolerable conditions, the lower court's ruling and the court of
appeals' affirmance made credibility determinations, weighed the
evidence, and determined facts, functions that are better left to the
fact finders. These are inappropriate determinations on a motion for
summary judgment." Courts considering whether an employee has a
cause of action for wrongful discipline must be careful not to intrude
upon the province of the jury. The jury, not the judge, in most cases,
should find the facts necessary to decide whether the employee has
suffered wrongful discipline.
D. A Potential Model: Wrongful Discipline as an Adverse
Employment Action
In many but not all cases of wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy, the employer acts in retaliation against an employee for
engaging in behaviors or speech that protect the public policy of the
state. To the extent these public policies are sufficiently important to
protect an employee against wrongful discharge, they must also
protect an employee against wrongful discipline that amounts to an
adverse employment action. An adverse employment action would
include a material change in the employee's working conditions or
harassment that is severe or pervasive. It would include a failure to
promote, a demotion, a transfer that would alter the employee's
working conditions, or if the employer created or tolerated a hostile
working environment as a result of the individual's engaging in the
protected action. A test similar to that established by the Supreme
Court in Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway v. White, case
brought under the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil
52. Id. at 765-66.
53. Id. at 766.
54. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Ann C. McGinley,
Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title
VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REv. 203,235-43 (1993).
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Rights Act of 1964, would be useful." In Burlington Northern, the
Court established the proper test:
We conclude that the antiretaliation provision does not confine the
actions and harms it forbids to those that are related to
employment or occur at the workplace. We also conclude that the
provision covers those (and only those) employer actions that
would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or
job applicant. In the present context that means that the employer's
actions must be harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.5
This test gives employees protection from retaliation that occurs
inside or outside of the workplace that is sufficiently harmful to
dissuade a reasonable worker from making a charge. Although this
appears to be an objective test, it permits the fact finder to take into
account the personal characteristics and situation of the employee in
question. As the Court explained, context matters. The Court stated:
A schedule change in an employee's work schedule may make little
difference to many workers, but may matter enormously to a young
mother with school-age children. A supervisor's refusal to invite an
employee to lunch is normally trivial, a nonactionable petty slight.
But to retaliate by excluding an employee from a weekly training
lunch that contributes significantly to the employee's professional
advancement might well deter a reasonable employee from
complaining about discriination.5
Thus, the fact finder needs to consider the context of the situation,
the personal and professional situation of the employee, and the
detriment imposed on that person by the employer's action. This
objective test that considers the context of the workplace and the
situation of the individual employee would encourage employees to
report illegal behaviors and to engage in behaviors protected by
public policy. This standard should apply to constructive discharge
cases brought by plaintiffs under section 5.01 even in those states that
do not adopt a broader wrongful discipline cause of action in
violation of public policy. A similar test that was applied
55. 548 U.S. 53 (2006). The Burlington Northern test is similar to that used in an earlier
version of the Restatement of Employment Law. That earlier version states:
"Other material adverse action" in this Section means an action short of discharge that
is reasonably likely to deter a similarly situated employee from engaging in protected
activity, including an action that significantly affects employee compensation or
working conditions.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP'T LAW § 4.02(b) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1,
2008).
56. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 57.
57. Id. at 69 (citations omitted).
2017] 527
528 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 21:511
appropriately in the summary judgment context appears in Martin v.
Canon Business Solutions, Inc., a case decided by the federal district
court in Colorado, which denied the defendant's motion for summary
judgment." In Martin, the plaintiff, a new mother, took leave under
the Family and Medical Leave Act and ultimately sued her employer
for retaliation and other related claims.59 The Martin court held that
there were genuine issues of material fact to be decided by a jury in
determining whether the employer illegally retaliated against the
employee.i Among the allegations supported by the evidence were a
harassing environment, reassignment of some of the plaintiff's
accounts, which made it difficult for her to meet her sales goals, and a
refusal to provide an appropriate location to express breast milk once
the plaintiff returned to work after having her baby."
We believe that states should adopt a wrongful discipline cause
of action that includes not only discharge but also discipline as well; in
the absence of this decision, a court's recognition that retaliation
often constitutes constructive discharge is important. Because
retaliation and constructive discharge cases rest upon fact-laden
determinations that are easily within the ordinary experience of the
jury, the courts should not usurp the jury's role in most cases by
granting summary judgment to the defendant.
IV. THE ERROR OF ADDING "REASONABLE" TO SECTION 5.02
A. The State of the Law
Section 5.02 of the Restatement states as follows:
An employer is subject to liability in tort under § 5.01 for
discharging an employee because the employee, acting in a
reasonable manner:
a refuses to commit an act that the employee
reasonably and in good faith believes violates a law or
other well-established public policy, such as a professional
or occupational code of conduct protective of the public
interest;
b performs a public duty or obligation that the
employee reasonably and in good faith believes the law
imposes;
58. No. 11-CV-02565-WJM-KMT, 2013 WL 4838913 (D. Colo. Sept. 10, 2013).
59. See id., at *2. Thanks to Scott Moss for directing us to this well-reasoned case.
60. Id. at *7.
61. Id. at *1-3.
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c files a charge or claims a benefit in good faith under
an employment statute or law, whether or not the charge
or claim is meritorious;
d. refuses to waive a nonnegotiable or nonwaivable
right when the employer's insistence on the waiver as a
condition of employment, or the court's enforcement of
the waiver, would violate a well-established public policy;
e. reports or inquires about conduct that the employee
reasonably and in good faith believes violates a law or an
established principle of a professional or occupational
code of conduct protective of the public interest; or
f. en gages in other activity furthering a well-established
policy.
As the reader can see, sub-sections (a), (b), and (e) contain a
requirement that the employee's belief be "reasonable" and in good
faith. Subsection (c) addresses filing a charge or claiming a benefit, in
which case the employee only needs to file the claim in good faith,
whether or not the charge is meritorious. Subsection (c) is consistent
with how the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII is interpreted.
Title VII differentiates between "participation" and "opposition."6 3
With respect to "participation" (filing a charge with the EEOC, filing
a complaint in court, or participating in any of these proceedings),
Title VII protects the plaintiff even if the plaintiff is wrong on the
merits of the charge and even if the plaintiff did not have a
reasonable belief that the charge was meritorious.6
Subsection (d) does not involve a plaintiff's belief; instead, it
protects an employee if the employee refuses to "waive a
nonnegotiable or nonwaivable right when the employer's insistence
on the waiver as a condition of employment, or the court's
enforcement of the waiver, would violate a well-established public
policy." 65 And subsection (f) is the catch-all defense - protecting
employees for engaging in "other activity furthering a well-
established policy.""
But the other three provisions that require a "belief" all require
62. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 5.02 (Am. LAW INST. 2015) (emphasis added).
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012).
64. See, e.g., Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 582 (6th Cir. 2000). In fact, some
courts allow a valid retaliation claim even if the charge filed was not in good faith. See id.
However, other courts require the charge to have been filed in good faith. See, e.g., Mattson v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 890 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that a charge filed in bad faith is not
protected activity).
65. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 5.02(d).
66. Id. § 5.02(f).
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that the belief be "reasonable" and in "good faith." We recognize that
these provisions are an accurate statement of the law." For instance,
in Green v. Ralee Engineering Co.,6 the employee/plaintiff noticed
that the defendant, who manufactured "fuselage and wing
components for military and civilian aircraft," was shipping some
airplane parts that had failed the inspections that the plaintiff's team
performed on the parts.69 When the plaintiff was terminated, he
alleged that his employer terminated him in retaliation for his
complaints about his employer's inspection practices.o The defendant
argued that the plaintiff failed to prove that the "defendant actually
violated any law, including FAA regulations, or that the defendant's
alleged inadequate inspection practices were, in fact, hazardous."71 In
response, the court stated that an "employee need not prove an actual
violation of law; it suffices if the employer fired him for reporting his
'reasonably based suspicions' of illegal activity."
In Schriner v. Meginnis Ford Co. ,7 the plaintiff was a body shop
mechanic for the employer. At one point, he purchased a used vehicle
from his employer and as part of that transaction, he was provided
with an odometer statement that said the mileage of the vehicle was
48,282.74 A few years later, when the car's mileage read 70,000, the car
developed engine trouble, and the mechanic who worked on the
vehicle said that it was "virtually impossible" for a vehicle with that
mileage to have sustained such severe damage and therefore, the
odometer must have been rolled back prior to the purchase.7 ' The
plaintiff then went to the Lancaster County clerk's office "where he
was 'mistakenly' informed that the records indicated that the vehicle
had over 100,000 miles when it was purchased by him." 76 Thus, the
plaintiff believed that his employer had fraudulently represented the
67. See, e.g., Palmer v. Brown, M.D., 752 P.2d 685, 689-90 (Kan. 1988) (stating that an
employee can bring a cause of action if terminated in retaliation for reporting a serious
infraction of law by a co-worker or the employer as long as a "reasonably prudent person would
have concluded the employee's co-worker or employer was engaged in activities that violate
rules, regulations, or the law"); Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 828 A.2d 893. 901-02 (N.J. 2003) (stating
that the plaintiff must have an objectively reasonable belief that a violation of a statute, rule, or
regulation has occurred).
68. 960 P.2d 1046 (Cal. 1998).
69. Id. at 1049.
70. Id. at 1050.
71. Id. at 1058.
72. Id. at 1059.
73. 421 N.W.2d 755 (Neb. 1988).
74. Id. at 756.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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mileage of the vehicle.77
Based on this belief, the plaintiff contacted the Nebraska
Attorney General's office concerning the "possible violation of state
odometer laws."" Subsequently, a member of the Attorney General's
office visited the dealership and investigated the transaction but
found the evidence "insufficient to establish odometer fraud" for the
plaintiff's vehicle. 79 The owner of Meginnis Ford found Schriner at
work, yelled at him, and eventually terminated him, stating that
Meginnis Ford could not tolerate "this sort of stuff" happening at the
dealership."
While recognizing the existence of public policy claims for
reporting the violation of state law, the court stated that a claim is
only valid if the employee acts in "good faith and upon reasonable
cause in reporting his employer's suspected violation of the criminal
code."" The court held that even though Schriner had a reasonable
belief that odometer fraud had been committed by someone, he did
not have a reasonable belief that it was his employer, Meginnis Ford,
who had committed the odometer fraud." These are just a couple of
examples of the many cases requiring a showing of the employee's
"reasonable" belief. They illustrate that the Restatement drafters are
correct that most courts that address this issue follow the reasonable
belief rule.
To be clear, however, some courts have held that a public policy
claim requires an actual violation of the law - even a reasonable,
good faith belief is not enough. For instance, in Bordell v. General
Electric Co.,83 the plaintiff was employed by General Electric as a
health physicist when he reported to his supervisors that some
employees might have been exposed to radiation levels sufficient to
trigger Department of Energy mandatory reporting requirements.
When his supervisors ignored his complaint, he complained directly
to the Department of Energy, and was subsequently terminated.' The
court held that the law in New York requires an actual violation of
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 757.
81. Id. at 759.
82. Id.
83. 667 N.E.2d 922 (N.Y. 1996).
84. Id. at 922.
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the law - a reasonable good faith belief is not enough."'
Similarly, a Texas court, in Bowen v. E-Systems, Inc., held that a
public policy claim requires the plaintiff to prove the discharge was
caused by the plaintiff's refusal to perform an act that could result in
criminal penalties against the employee." In so holding, the court
refused to follow another Texas case (Johnston v. Del Mar
Distributors) that allowed for a public policy claim for an "employee
who, in good faith, believes that her employer has requested she
perform an act that may subject her to criminal penalties."" As the
court in Bowen makes clear, the court in Johnston is an outlier in
Texas and referred to a situation where the employee investigated
whether an act that she was asked to perform was legal or not."
Some courts hold that the plaintiff lacks a public policy claim
when the plaintiff refuses to perform an act that she believes is
unlawful, but the court does not explicitly address the issue of
whether the law in that state requires a reasonable, good faith belief
or an actual violation of the law. For instance, in Callantine v. Staff
Builders, Inc.," the Eighth Circuit (applying Missouri law) held that
the plaintiff lacked a claim because the act she refused to perform
that led to her termination (signing a backdated form to authorize
Medicare coverage for home visits) was not unlawful. But the court
never discussed whether the plaintiff's belief that the conduct was
unlawful was reasonable and whether that would have been enough
to support her claim."0
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit (applying California law) held that a
plaintiff could not bring a public policy claim when he was terminated
for refusing to work based on his erroneous belief that he would be
violating the law in doing so.9' The plaintiff was employed as a
85. Id. at 923; see also Green v. Saratoga A.R.C., 233 A.D.2d 821, 822 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996) (refusing to overturn the holding in Bordell that the plaintiff must demonstrate an actual
violation of law to sustain a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy).
86. No. 05-95-00821-CV, No. 05-95-00821-CV, 1996 WL 499814, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App.
1996).
87. Id. at *3 (citing Johnston v. Del Mar Distrib. Co., 776 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989)).
88. Id. (citing Johnston, 776 S.W.2d at 771-72 (holding that when the employer discharges
the employee for contacting a regulatory agency to determine whether a requested act is illegal,
the employee must have a good faith and reasonable belief that the requested act might be
illegal but doesn't need to prove that the requested act was actually illegal)); see also Camunes
v. Frontier Enters., Inc., 61 S.W.3d 579, 580-81 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (refusing to expand Texas
public policy claims to allow claims for inquiring into whether a requested act was unlawful).
89. Callantine v. Staff Builders, Inc., 271 F.3d 1124,1131 (8th Cir. 2001).
90. Id.
91. DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).
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delivery driver and he was assigned a trailer that had expired
registration papers for Illinois and an expired prorated vehicle tag for
California.' Despite receiving a letter from his employer stating that
the employer accepted complete responsibility for the lack of
registration, the plaintiff refused to deliver a load in the trailer, and
the employer terminated him.93 The court held: "Because it was legal
to drive the trailer, and because no fundamental public policy concern
was involved," the district court properly dismissed the plaintiff's
claims.9 4 The court seemed to be applying an "actual violation" rule
but it never discussed whether the plaintiff could have succeeded if he
reasonably believed that he was being asked to perform an act that
was unlawful.
B. The Error of Adding "Reasonable"
As stated in Part II, the prior draft of the Restatement did not
include the requirement that the plaintiff "reasonably believe" (a)
that the act being requested by the employer violates a law or
established principle of professional conduct; (b) that the act
performed is one that is imposed by law; or (d) that the report or
inquiry about employer conduct violates a law or established
principle of professional conduct."
Instead, the prior version of section 5.02 stated:
§ 4.02. Employer Discipline in Violation of Public Policy: Protected
Activities
An employer is subject to liability in tort under §4.02 for
disciplining an employee who acting in a reasonable manner
a. refuses to commit an act that the employee in good faith
believes violates a law or established principle of
professional conduct that protects the public interest;
b. performs a public duty or obligation that the employee in
good faith believes is imposed by law;
c. files a charge or claims a benefit under the procedures of
an employment statute or law (irrespective of whether the
charge or claim is meritorious);
d. reports or inquires about employer conduct that the
employee in good faith believes violates a law or
established principle of professional conduct protective of
92. Id. at 656.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 659.
95. Working Group, supra note 2, at 183 (citing the elements of section 4.02, which, as
noted above, was the section used in the prior draft of the Restatement).
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the public interest; or
e. engages in other activity furthering a substantial public
policy."
As the reader can see, there is a requirement that an employee
must be "acting in a reasonable manner" for all of the activities in
section 4.02, but there is not a separate requirement that each act or
refusal to act must be based on a "reasonable" belief. We believe that
the prior draft of the Restatement is the better approach.
Thus, although the Restatement Reporters' addition of the word
"reasonable" in subsections (a), (b), and (e) of section 5.02 is
consistent with existing law, we believe the better approach is to
require only a good faith belief, and that the conduct (the report,
action, or refusal to act) be done in a reasonable manner. The only
substantive change that would be required to the actual language of
section 5.02 would be to delete the word "reasonably" in sub-sections
(a), (b), and (e).
We believe this is the better approach for three reasons: (1) the
"reasonable belief" requirement creates an unacceptably high
standard because it assumes that lay-persons (employees) know and
can understand the law in a way that is completely devoid of reality;
(2) because the protected activities of section 5.02 all involve activities
that arguably benefit the public, employees reporting possible illegal
activity or refusing to engage in possible unlawful activity should be
encouraged rather than discouraged; and (3) employers are
sufficiently protected by the requirement that the report, action, or
refusal to act is done in a reasonable manner and based on a good
faith belief. We address each of these in turn.
1. "Reasonable" Belief Requirement Creates an Unacceptably High
Standard
Requiring that an employee "reasonably" believe that a law is
being (or will be) violated or that the law requires a particular action
creates an unacceptably high standard. First of all, as courts and
commentators have argued in the context of public policy claims9 and
96. Id. at 183-84 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP'T LAW § 4.02 (AM. LAW INST.,
Council Draft No. 3, 2008) (emphasis added).
97. See, e.g., id. at 187-88 (criticizing one of the sections for requiring more than a good-
faith belief, stating: "Employees, most of whom are not lawyers, should not be expected to
ascertain with absolute precision the legal enforceability of a right or contract clause"); see also
Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 707 A.2d 1000, 1015-16 (N.J. 1998) (stating that the object of the
whistleblowing statute is not to "make lawyers out of conscientious employees but rather to
prevent retaliation against those employees who object to employer conduct that they
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retaliation claims pursuant to anti-discrimination statutes," non-
lawyer employees cannot possibly be expected to know when a
particular action violates the law, especially when the court uses a
standard that does not look only at a particular statute, but also at the
case law interpreting the statute.9 There are several examples where
the court held that employees did not have a reasonable belief that
the conduct they were reporting, complaining about, or refusing to
perform was illegal, and these decisions were reached by reviewing
the relevant law, without asking whether a lay person, not trained in
the law, would have a reason to know or understand the relevant
law.'00 We believe it is both unrealistic and unfair to expect lay
persons to have consulted with legal authorities if they honestly
believe that their employer is engaging in wrongdoing or that they are
being asked to engage in wrongdoing.
In addition to the reasonable belief standard requiring lay-
persons to have knowledge and an understanding of the law that is
unrealistic, the reasonable belief requirement, as a factual matter,
sometimes is applied in a way that defeats the purpose of the public
policy claim. For instance, as discussed above, in Schriner v. Meginnis
reasonably believe to be unlawful or indisputably dangerous to the public health, safety or
welfare"). Despite this statement in Mehlman, the court still required an "objectively reasonable
belief, at the time of objection or refusal to participate in the employer's offensive activity, that
such activity is either illegal, fraudulent or harmful to the public health, safety or welfare." Id at
1015.
98. See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REv. 18, 76-77 (2005) (stating that
"[m]ost people lack knowledge about whether what they perceive as discrimination is actually
unlawful, and judicial outcomes in discrimination cases frequently depend on the identity of
judges and jurors"); Lawrence D. Rosenthal, To Report or Not to Report: The Case for
Elimination the Objectively Reasonable Requirement for Opposition Activities Under Title VII's
Anti-Retaliation Provision, 39 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1127, 1131 (2007) (arguing that the objective test
"forces employees to essentially become law experts before deciding whether to report behavior
they believe is unlawful").
99. See, e.g., Brianne J. Gorod, Rejecting "Reasonableness": A New Look at Title VII's
Anti-Retaliation Provision, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 1469, 1492 (2007) (criticizing a decision where the
court assumed that the appropriate benchmark for assessing the reasonableness of the plaintiffs
belief in reporting harassing behavior was the definition of sexual harassment established in the
case law). As Gorod states, when someone complains of discrimination, her belief is most often
intuitive and not the result of a "studious examination of the Federal Reporters, but rather the
product of popular understanding." Id. In contrast, the courts determine reasonableness of the
plaintiff's belief based on what the law says, rather than what the general public believes. This
approach holds plaintiffs responsible for understanding the current state of the law. Id. And in
areas where the law surrounding harassment or discrimination is uncertain, Gorod points out:
"if the courts cannot agree, how are individual citizens supposed to know?" Id. at 1495.
100. See, e.g., Hitesman v. Bridgeway, Inc., 63 A.3d 230, 234-38 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 2013) (stating
that the plaintiff cannot prove his claim when he was terminated for complaining about
improper patient care and high rates of infection at the nursing home that he worked at because
he could not point to a particular statute that the employer had violated).
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Ford Co.,10' the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that, although a
public policy claim could lie when an employee is fired because he
reported possible illegal behavior of his employer (odometer fraud),
the employee did not have a reasonable belief that his employer had
engaged in the offense of odometer fraud.02 The court stated:
In this case, Schriner had reasonable cause to believe that
odometer fraud had been committed by someone, but not
necessarily by Meginnis Ford. He knew that the vehicle was used;
there is nothing in the evidence which suggests that Schriner saw
anyone at Meginnis Ford change the odometer or that Schriner had
reason to believe that Meginnis Ford routinely or otherwise
engaged in such a practice. In the absence of such evidence, it
cannot be said Schriner had reasonable cause to believe that
Meginnis Ford had violated the odometer fraud statutes .... 103
This is a troubling case, from our perspective. First, reasonable
minds can differ regarding whether Schriner's belief was reasonable,'
and yet, the procedural posture of the case is an appeal from a grant
of the employer's motion for summary judgment."' This evaluation
requires the fact finder to consider the employee's testimony and
demeanor at trial. Second, the reasonable person standard is too
susceptible to applying 20/20 hindsight to the employee's belief. As
the dissent in this case noted: "The rigorous standard imposed upon
employees to establish reasonable cause in these cases may well bury
meritorious claims forever."'" To be clear, the dissent did not
challenge the reasonable cause standard, but instead, argued that the
court should have let a jury decide whether the plaintiff had
reasonable cause to believe that his employer had committed
odometer fraud. As stated by the dissent:
The majority admits in this case that "Schriner had reasonable
cause to believe that odometer fraud had been committed by
someone. . . ." I believe that "someone" includes his employer. If
Schriner had reasonable cause to believe someone rolled back his
car's odometer, it cannot possibly be unreasonable to infer that the
business from which he purchased the vehicle may have been the
culprit. Schriner then had reason to believe that his employer, the
seller in this circumstance, had "otherwise engaged in" odometer
fraud, even without evidence that such was a routine practice or
101. 421 N.W.2d 755 (Neb. 1988).
102. Id. at 759.
103. Id.
104. This is evidenced by the fact that there was a dissenting judge in this case.
105. Id. at 756.
106. Id. at 759 (White, J., dissenting).
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without actually witnessing the act.'o
The dissent's difference of opinion about the reasonableness of the
plaintiff's belief is precisely one of the problems with the reasonable
belief requirement.i
2. Encouraging Behaviors that Protect the Public
The six categories of protected activity in section 5.02 are not
simply protecting employees. The reason they are included is because
they are all protective of the public. In fact, when employees
complain of or report behavior that only affects the employer, and is
not detrimental to the public, they lose their claim. For instance, in
Fox v. MCI Communications Corp.,' the court stated that an
employee who reports wrongdoing by co-employees to his employer,
rather than to public authorities, and is fired for making such reports
does not have a valid public policy claim."o The court stated:
"Although employees may have a duty to disclose information
concerning the employer's business to their employer, that duty
ordinarily serves the private interest of the employer, not the public
interest.".1 . Moreover, the court emphasized that even though the
conduct of plaintiff's co-workers may have resulted in some increased
costs of the employer's products and services and thus had a minor
effect on the employer's shareholders, this did not implicate a "clear
and substantial public policy."11 2 Even though we do not necessarily
agree with this case, it demonstrates that the activities that are
covered by section 5.02 do implicate the interest of the public and
therefore should be encouraged and protected. If the law protects
only an employee who reports suspected wrongful activity that
potentially harms the public based on a reasonable belief standard,
many employees who are aware of such activity will be discouraged
from reporting it. The public is not served by such a rule.
107. Id. at 759-60.
108. See also Rosenthal, supra note 98, at 1131 (arguing that the objective standard leads to
inconsistency as courts reach different conclusions as to what constitutes a reasonable belief).
109. 931 P.2d 857 (Utah 1997).
110. Id. at 861.
111. Id.
112. Id.; see also Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 380 (Cal. 1988) (holding that
an employee who was discharged after informing his employer of former suspected criminal
activity by a new employee who was to be the plaintiff's supervisor did not have a valid public
policy claim because there was no public interest at stake - the suspected illegal behavior would
only harm the employer and not the public).
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3. Employers Are Protected by a "Good Faith" Requirement and by
Requiring that the Protected Activity Be Performed in a "Reasonable
Manner"
Although we recognize employers' legitimate interests and
prerogative in effectively and efficiently running their businesses as
they see fit, we believe that this interest can be served by courts
thoughtfully evaluating whether the employee's activity was done in
good faith and by requiring that the means by which the employee
engages in protected activity be reasonable.
The good faith inquiry is straightforward"' - the court would
simply inquire into whether the plaintiff honestly believed that the
conduct he was reporting, complaining about, or avoiding violated a
law, statute, or furthered some other substantial public policy. If the
employer suspects that the employee's attempted protected activity is
not in good faith - either because the employee is attempting to harm
another employee out of vengeance or some other personal
animosity, or perhaps because the employee is attempting to protect
himself against anticipated and legitimate discipline, this evidence
would not be too difficult to uncover. An employee acting out of
vengeance or some other nefarious motive will likely have discussed
this with someone at the workplace. And the timing of an employee
making a complaint or reporting alleged wrongdoing immediately
preceding a planned (and likely leaked) discipline or termination will
usually be an obvious ploy to fact-finders.
The key to protecting employers' legitimate interests and
prerogatives in effectively and efficiently running their businesses is
the requirement (already present in section 5.02) that, when engaging
in any of the protected activities in section 5.02, the employee must be
"acting in a reasonable manner."114 Unreasonable reports or
complaints or unreasonably refusing to perform a requested task by
the employer is what causes employers to have legitimate concerns
when trying to run their businesses.
Consider this example: a nurse in a hospital honestly believes
that one of the doctors has been ordering procedures to be performed
on patients that the nurse thinks are harmful to the patients' health. It
turns out the nurse is wrong about her beliefs (unreasonably so), but
113. Rosenthal, supra note 98, at 1169 (stating that it is usually fairly easy to determine
whether an employee has a subjective, good-faith belief that an employer has engaged in
unlawful conduct).
114. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 5.02 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
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she honestly believes that, in order to protect the patients of the
hospital, she needs to report this doctor to someone at the hospital.
Thus, the employee schedules a meeting with a human resources
(HR) representative and explains her concerns. The HR
representative meets with the doctor, who explains that the
employee's belief is erroneous and explains why to the HR
representative's satisfaction. This is subsequently explained to the
nurse, who, because she is acting reasonably, accepts the explanation
and drops the matter. Nevertheless, the doctor demands that the
nurse be fired, and she is. The nurse should have a valid public policy
claim even though she was wrong (and unreasonably so) about
whether the doctor was ordering procedures that were harmful to the
patients' health. Her report did not harm the employer at all; and in
fact, only harmed the doctor's ego. Even though she was
unreasonable in her belief, she should still be protected.
Now change the facts a bit. The same nurse has the same good
faith but unreasonable belief about the same possible wrongdoing by
the doctor. But instead of one polite complaint to the HR
department, the nurse loudly talks about her suspicions to other
nurses, other doctors, and anyone else who will listen. Some patients
overhear the nurse's accusation, and a bit of panic ensues. Even after
it has been explained to the nurse why her belief is erroneous, she
refuses to drop the matter. In this case, even though the plaintiff's
belief about possible wrongdoing that potentially implicated the
public's health was in good faith, she should not be protected. But it is
not her unreasonable belief about the wrongdoing that precludes her
from having a valid public policy claim; it is the unreasonable manner
in which she attempts to engage in protected activity. In this case, her
alleged protected activity did harm the employer and it would be
justified in terminating her.
An example of this distinction can be found in Almeida v.
University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey,"' where the
plaintiff was fired for not performing an x-ray that he was asked to
perform. The plaintiff was a radiology technician whose job duties
included performing portable x-ray examinations ordered by a
physician.116 While he was working the midnight shift one night, a
doctor he did not know asked him to complete a chest x-ray on a
patient. Almeida believed that there were laws governing x-rays and
115. No. L-5746-09, 2014 WL 8240514 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Mar. 23, 2015).
116. Id. at *1.
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that those laws stated that he was only allowed to perform an x-ray
after receipt of a "written requisition from a licensed physician."117
The plaintiff asked the doctor if he had completed a requisition for
the x-ray and the doctor indicated that he had not. The plaintiff told
the doctor that the doctor should call the radiology desk and submit a
request and that once the request was generated, the plaintiff would
perform the x-ray." The plaintiff allegedly checked with the
radiology desk a couple of times during his busy shift, but no
requisition had been generated.119 The plaintiff completed his shift at
the hospital without having completed the x-ray that he had been
verbally instructed to perform. 12 0 The patient for whom the x-ray was
ordered died a half-hour after the plaintiff left. 21 When questioned
about why he had not completed the x-ray as ordered, the plaintiff
only answered that it was a busy night shift and that he might have
forgotten to do the x-ray.122 He submitted a written statement,
asserting that he thought the x-ray request had been cancelled.12 ' The
employer eventually terminated him for failure to follow directives.24
Plaintiff filed a complaint, challenging his discharge, and stating
that he believed that performing an x-ray on a patient without a
requisition form was illegal and that is why he had refused to perform
the x-ray.125 The trial court denied the employer's motion for
summary judgment, and the case went to trial.12' At trial, the
defendant moved for dismissal at the end of the plaintiff's case and at
the close of evidence, both of which were denied. The jury found for
the plaintiff, and the trial court denied the defendant's motion for
judgment in its favor or a new trial.1 27 The appellate court proceeded
through a very detailed parsing of the various statutes and regulations
that the plaintiff relied upon to support his assertion that he
reasonably believed that it was unlawful for him to perform an x-ray
without a written request.'" The court stated that none of the
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at *2.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. Of course, he later argued that he did not complete the x-ray because the doctor
who ordered it did not do so in writing.
124. Id. at *3.
125. Id.
126. Id. at *4.
127. Id.
128. Id. at *5.
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regulations or statutes plaintiff cited contained a requirement that a
licensed practitioner order an x-ray in writing.129 Thus, even though
the court recognized that specific knowledge of the precise source of
public policy is not necessary because the purpose is not to "make
lawyers out of conscientious employees but rather to prevent
retaliation against those employees who object to employer conduct
that they reasonably believe to be unlawful or indisputably dangerous
to the public health," 30 the court nevertheless held that the plaintiff
had no "objectively reasonable belief" that a violation had occurred
and reversed the jury verdict and ordered judgment for the
defendant."'
The plaintiff in this case had an honest, good-faith belief that it
was unlawful for him to perform an x-ray without a written
requisition. In fact, the hospital policy required a written requisition.
And yet, despite the trial court's repeated denial of the defendant's
motions for judgment as a matter of law and the jury verdict in his
favor - both of which indicate that reasonable minds could conclude
that the plaintiff had a reasonable belief that performing the x-ray
would be unlawful - the court held otherwise, substituting its own
judgment of what is reasonable for the jury's judgment.
Under our proposal, the plaintiff could have proven that he
engaged in protected activity because the standard would be one of
good faith, not objective reasonableness. And yet, we believe that the
employer should have won, not because the plaintiff was
unreasonably wrong about his belief that x-ray requests had to be in
writing, but because he did not engage in his opposition activity in a
"reasonable manner." Instead of refusing to perform the x-ray, and
failing to follow up to make sure it was eventually completed, if he
had been acting in a "reasonable manner," he should have reported
to someone that a doctor had requested an x-ray without a written
requisition and asked how to proceed. Whether the hospital exercised
good business judgment in deciding to terminate him is a close call,
but it does not appear to us that the decision was based on a
retaliatory motive; it was instead based on the plaintiff's failure to
exercise good judgment under the circumstances.
129. Id. at *7.
130. Id. (quoting Mehiman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 707 A.3d 1000, 1015-16 (N.J. 1998)).
131. Id. at *8.
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4. Similar Arguments Under Analogous Areas of Law
As many readers know, to establish a valid retaliation claim for
opposingl32 unlawful activity under Title VII,'33 the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act,4' and the Americans with
Disabilities Act,' the plaintiff generally" must demonstrate that she
had a reasonable, good-faith belief that the conduct she complained
about violated the statute.m
132. As stated above, supra note 63 and accompanying text, Title VII differentiates
between "opposition" and "participation" activities, giving more absolute protection when a
plaintiff "participates" by filing a charge with the EEOC or filing a complaint in court. Here, we
are referring to a plaintiff's "opposition" activities, which usually involve complaining internally
(to a supervisor or human resources representative) rather than filing a charge or complaint.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012).
134. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2012) ("It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against
any of his employees ... because such individual ... has opposed any practice made unlawful by
this section.").
135. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2012) ("No person shall discriminate against any individual
because such individual has opposed any act ... made unlawful by [the ADA].").
136. We use the word "generally" because the Supreme Court has never definitively
addressed this issue. In Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001), the Court
had the opportunity to determine if the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII applies only to
opposed acts that are actually unlawful under Title VII or whether a plaintiff's good-faith,
reasonable belief should suffice. Id. at 270. The Court recognized that the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit had protected employee opposition not just to practices that are actually
unlawful but also to practices that the employee could reasonably believe were unlawful. Id. But
the Court stated that it had "no occasion to rule on the propriety of this interpretation, because
even assuming it is correct, no one could reasonably believe that the incident [the employee
complained about] violated Title VII." Id.
137. See, e.g., Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002) (stating
that an opposition clause claim requires a reasonable and good faith belief that the employer
violated Title VII); Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 265 F.3d 903, 913 (9th Cir. 2001)
(same); Foster v. Time Warner Entm't Co., L.P., 250 F.3d 1189, 1195 (8th Cir. 2001) (same);
McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279, 285 (2d Cir. 2001) (same); Hamner v. St. Vincent
Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 706-07 (7th Cir. 2000) (same); Johnson v. Univ. of
Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 580 (6th Cir. 2000) (same); Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15 (1st
Cir. 1994) (stating that a "claim concerning the opposition clause requires that the employee
have a reasonable belief that the practice the employee is opposing violates Title VII");
Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 865 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that a long line of
Title VII cases hold that a plaintiff "establishes a retaliation claim if she avows that she had a
reasonable belief that her employer was engaged in an unlawful employment practice and that
the employer retaliated against her for protesting against that practice"); Parker v. Baltimore &
Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1019-20 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (agreeing with the standard that a
plaintiff claiming retaliation need only have a reasonable and good faith belief that the
underlying conduct violated Title VII). But see Keys v. U.S. Welding, Fabricating & Mfg., Inc.,
No. CV91-0113, 1992 WL 218302, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 26, 1992) (stating that a plaintiff
bringing a retaliation claim under Title VII need only have a "good faith belief" that the
company practice he opposed violated Title VII). Interestingly, this case has no "negative
treatment" flag on Westlaw but it seems to be clearly overruled by the Sixth Circuit's decision in
the Johnson case cited above. See also Love v. RE/MAX of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 385 (10th
Cir. 1984) (requiring only a good faith belief). This case was decided before the Supreme
Court's opinion in Breeden, but as noted by Professor Rosenthal, the 10th Circuit continued to
use the subjective, good-faith test for a period of time after Breeden. Rosenthal, supra note 98,
at 1136-38.
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Similar to our argument here, several scholars have argued that
the reasonable belief requirement under Title VII and other anti-
discrimination statutes should be abandoned'" for several reasons:
that it stifles the broad remedial goals of Title VII and other anti-
discrimination statutes;139 that it places employees in an unfair catch-
22 (with respect to reporting harassment);140 that it judges the
reasonableness of the belief based on a judge's law-trained
perspective, rather than the perspective of a lay-person; 141 and that
informal complaints should be encouraged rather than discouraged. 42
Although beyond the scope of this paper, we agree with these
scholars' critiques of the reasonable belief requirement under anti-
discrimination statutes.
V. CONCLUSION
We believe that Chapter 5 of the Restatement of Employment
Law should have kept two features of its earlier draft: (1) creating
causes of action for wrongful discharge and wrongful discipline that
falls short of discharge; and (2) not requiring that an employee
"reasonably" believe that conduct reported or avoided violates the
law. Given the power that employers have over employees' lives and
working conditions and the difficult economic circumstances that
many employees endure, the employment-at-will doctrine creates
undue pressure on employees to keep their mouths shut and to fail to
engage in behaviors that support the state's public policy. One way
that courts that decide to adopt the Restatement public policy tort can
assure that their states' public policies have the maximum protection
is to adopt both of the changes proposed in this paper.
138. See, e.g., Brake, supra note 98; Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, 89
IND. L.J. 115, 165-66 (2014); Gorod, supra note 99; Rosenthal, supra note 98; Craig Robert
Senn, Redefining Protected "Opposition" Activity in Employment Retaliation Cases, 37
CARDOZO L. REV. 2035 2035-36 (2016).
139. See, e.g., Brake, supra note 98, at 55; Rosenthal, supra note 98, at 1150-51; Senn, supra
note 138, at 2048.
140. See, e.g., ; Brake, supra note 98, at 77; Brake, supra note 138, at 138-44; Rosenthal,
supra note 98, at 1149-50; Senn, supra note 138, at 2074-79.
141. See, e.g., Brake, supra note 98, at 76-77, 82; Gorod, supra note 99, at 1492, 1495;
Rosenthal, supra note 98, at 1131.
142. See, e.g., Brake, supra note 98, at 78; Senn, supra note 138, at 2079-81.
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